

Intervention Programme among Resettled Communities in Taraba State: Stakeholders' Structure and Power Dynamics

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Abstract

The study deployed a qualitative approach (Key Informant Interview) to elicit information from its sample subjects. The objective is to assess stakeholders' structure and power dynamics in the NEFSLESP intervention programme implemented under the auspices of Fadama-III-AF-II in Taraba State. A purposive sampling was used to select 15 key informants. The stakeholders' structure and interests are critical to the effectiveness of every development intervention. Who then were the stakeholders in the NEFSLESP intervention programme and what were their power distribution and interests? The findings reveal that Fadama officers (National, State and Local levels), community leaders, politicians, development agents, and service providers constitute the major stakeholder structure of the NEFSLESP intervention programme. The World Bank, the Nigerian Government, and the community leaders influenced the policy agenda of the intervention. The study further found that the programme's demand-driven nature meant the beneficiaries' ideas and needs dominated the intervention design. The key development values of the intervention include participatory governance, inclusivity, and demand-driven assistance. The power dynamics analysis also shows that the stakeholders identified exercise authority and influence based on their roles and interests. This study, therefore, contributes to political economy discourse about enhancing stakeholders' structures and power dynamics as a leads up to improving the effectiveness of intervention programmes. Thus, it recommends that the Government and civil society organisations should build systems that formally institutionalise the demand-driven nature of intervention programmes, thereby reducing elite capture of interventions.

Keywords: Intervention Programme, Resettled Communities, Stakeholders' Structure, Power Dynamics

Introduction

The recurring and devastating nature of displacement due to violent conflicts, militancy, and insurgency has become a critical challenge in the northeastern region of Nigeria and the country in general. In recent years, the number of displacement-affected communities has risen sharply in Nigeria, thereby exacerbating the vulnerabilities of already marginalised populations (IOM, 2022). Displacement has enormous socio-economic consequences, including disruption of social and cultural networks, livelihoods, and access to essential services such as healthcare, education, and clean water. The result is an increase in poverty levels, food insecurity, livelihood

impairment, and overall vulnerability, making it difficult for displaced populations to achieve a decent quality of life even after resettlement (Badewa & Dinbabo, 2023).

Addressing these multidimensional challenges requires a comprehensive approach that includes not only immediate relief but also long-term strategies for economic stability, social integration, and access to essential services. Numerous intervention programmes have been launched to address the immediate needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and to promote sustainable development in resettled communities. One such intervention is the North East Food Security and Livelihoods Emergency Support Project (NEFSLESP), which includes food assistance, agricultural livelihood inputs for crops and livestock, cash-for-work, community infrastructure, and other non-farm activities. Carried out under the auspices of the Fadama III-AF-II initiative, the programme aims to improve the quality of life for resettled internally displaced persons and enable them to contribute to the development of their conflict-devastated communities (World Bank, 2017; Badewa & Dinbabo, 2023).

Within the political economy framework, stakeholders' structure and their interest in an intervention programme determine the success or otherwise of the programme. Who were the stakeholders in the NEFSLESP intervention programme implemented through Fadama III-AF-II in Taraba State, and what were their power distribution and interests in the development and implementation of the programme? Was their elite capture of the programme? Were intervention resources meant for resettled vulnerable populations diverted to more influential groups? These questions provide an empirical guide to this study.

Intervention Programme

According to Godagama (2012), interventions entail the effective and sustainable provision of all necessary support to the displaced victims. It is a body of policy systematically designed to address social and economic disorder arising from humanitarian crises. The intervention programme creates and implements services and projects to offer immediate and sustainable assistance to the displaced population to guarantee productive resettlement and reintegration. In the view of Balogun, Okafor, Jimoh and Abdulaziz (2020) an “intervention is a series of strategies or programmes designed to bring about desirable change in behaviors of vulnerable groups or an entire population”. In this case, interventions may take different patterns and objectives, which are not limited to relief, educational, and development programmes, and improvements in the environment, or a health promotion campaign.

The needs of the resettled displaced persons, particularly those affected by violent conflict, are enormous. So, the combination of different strategies to address these needs has been accepted in the body of literature as the most effective in producing desired, lasting change, and durable solutions that match international standards (Balogun, Okafor, Jimoh & Abdulaziz, 2020). Enwereji (2009), as cited in Balogun, Okafor, Jimoh and Abdulaziz (2020), also argued that interventions for the displaced or resettled persons might be implemented in different settings, including communities, worksites, schools, healthcare organisations, faith-based organisations, or homes. This sustained the fact that intervention may be implemented in multiple settings using multiple strategies to reach a larger number of people in a variety of ways. This could create change by influencing individuals' knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and skills, increasing social support, and creating supportive environments, policies, and resources (Balogun, Okafor, Jimoh & Abdulaziz, 2020).

In 2017, the federal government implemented an intervention programme known as the North East Food Security and Livelihoods Emergency Support Project (NEFSLESP). The programme was funded by the World Bank in collaboration with the Nigerian Government, with

implementation driven by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development through the National Fadama Coordination Office (NFCO). It was targeted at addressing the observed vulnerability of resettled/returned internally displaced communities in conflict-affected communities and their host communities. The rationale of the programme was to support quick recovery and reconstruction of the North East States of Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Taraba, Bauchi, and Gombe that suffered severe disruptions due to insurgency and other forms of conflicts (World Bank, 2017).

The major objectives were livelihood support (providing agricultural inputs, small-scale farming facilities, and extension services to enhance productivity and food security), capacity building (training beneficiaries in modern farming techniques, agribusiness management, and value chain development), rural infrastructure development (rehabilitation of rural roads, market facilities, and storage systems to improve access to markets), and conflict resolution and social inclusion (encouraging community-driven development and promoting social cohesion among displaced persons and host communities) (World Bank, 2017).

The intervention implemented in Taraba State was in ten sub-sections, which include food assistance, input for agricultural livelihood: crop, livestock, and fishery; non-farm activities; community infrastructure; environmental safeguard; advisory services; cash for work; and capacity-building training for effective implementation and efficient sustainability (State Fadama III-AF-II, Report 2018). Sixty-seven (67) communities benefited across fifteen Local Government Areas from the intervention. Thirty-nine (39) out of the sixty-seven had resettled back to their communities. From this framework, an intervention policy is considered to be both reactive and distributive (Sha, 2023; Dodd & Boyd, 2000, as cited in Sha, 2023). Reactive because it addresses emerging issues related to displacement and the challenges of food insecurity, and disarticulation of livelihoods caused by insurgency. This enables a resettlement with empowerment to restore livelihoods and improve the quality of living as a strategy for resolving problems caused by displacement. As a distributive public policy, the intervention provided services and delivered packages to resettled IDPs and host communities in Taraba State.

Stakeholders Analysis

Stakeholders are individuals and organisations that have a vested interest in a given decision or policy under implementation. Every development project involves a range of stakeholders, each with different levels of interest and influence. Stakeholder analysis is a systematic approach used to assess these stakeholders based on their power and level of interest in the initiative. The process begins with identifying the relevant stakeholders, followed by evaluating their influence, interests, and potential impact on the project. The primary objective of stakeholder analysis is to determine which stakeholders are likely to support or resist the initiative, helping policymakers and project managers strategise accordingly. This type of analysis serves as a crucial tool in policy science for assessing key stakeholders' knowledge, interests, positions, alliances, and overall significance to a project (Sha, 2023).

Methodology

The study adopts a qualitative research approach within the interpretivist paradigm. The population of the study comprises of actors involved in the intervention programme within the Fadama-III-AF-II framework. These sets of populations are those that hold power and the stakeholders' interests. The reason for selecting these populations is that they played significant roles in the programme design and implementation, thereby helping in eliciting data on the overall structure of the stakeholders engaged in the programme implementation and the power

dynamics. A purposive sampling technique was used to collect primary data from the population. Key Informant Interview was conducted with 15 respondents (8 community leaders, 3 Fadama State officers, and 4 desk/facilitators at the local government level as contained in Table 1). The secondary data includes the document review from the Fadama office and other relevant materials from government publications and the internet. Sha (2023) emphasises that the political economy approach requires examining the interests and incentive structures of various classes or stakeholders within the organisation and programme under analysis. This perspective emphasises the influence of power relations, economic motivations, and institutional frameworks in determining intervention programmes and outcomes. The design of this study, therefore captures a stakeholder analysis which brings out the actors and their power relation to the programme. Data collected were thematically analysed and underscored: Stakeholders' Structure (SS), Power Dynamics and level of engagement: Setting of the policy agenda (SPA), dominant ideas and values in the intervention programme (DIV), and power distribution and interests among Stakeholders (PDIS).

Table 1: Profile of interviewed key informants

Name code	Location	Description	Gender
Key Informant 1 (K1)	Jalingo	Fadama State Officer	Male
Key Informant 2 (K2)	Jalingo	Fadama State Officer	Female
Key Informant 3 (K3)	Jalingo	Fadama State Officer	Male
Key Informant 4 (K4)	Sardauna	Facilitator	Male
Key Informant 5 (K5)	Donga	Facilitator	Female
Key Informant 6 (K6)	Wukari	Facilitator	Female
Key Informant 7 (K7)	Takum	Facilitator	Male
Key Informant 8 (K8)	Dorowa	Community Leader/Beneficiary	Male
Key Informant 9 (K9)	Rimi Uku Ibi	Community Leader/Beneficiary	Male
Key Informant 10 (K10)	Nwuko	Community Leader/Beneficiary	Male
Key Informant 11 (K11)	Nyakwala	Community Leader/Beneficiary	Male
Key Informant 12 (K12)	Sondi	Community Leader/Beneficiary	Male
Key Informant 13 (K13)	Ando Yaku	Community Leader/Beneficiary	Male
Key Informant 14 (K14)	Nwonyu	Community Leader/Beneficiary	Male
Key Informant 15 (K15)	Passoki	Community Leader/Beneficiary	Male

Ethical Consideration: Participants were informed about the purpose, methods, and potential impacts of the research, and their voluntary consent was obtained. Findings are clearly communicated and used responsibly.

Political Economy Analysis of Intervention Programme

Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time (DFID 2009 as cited in Sha, 2023). This definition established the connection between politics and economic processes. Politics in intervention programmes, for instance, exposes the game of power amongst actors as regards resources. This is further understood in terms of contestation and bargaining between interest groups with competing claims over rights and resources, and economic processes that generate wealth and how wealth influences the process of political choices.

Acosta and Pettit (2013) extend the analysis further by affirming that political economy analysis understands political actions and strategies through the lenses of economic institutionalism, by focusing on key actors, their interests, and what enables or hinders their cooperation. This analysis therefore helps us to understand what drives political behaviour, how this shapes policies and programmes, who the main actors are (both winners and losers), and what the implications are for development strategies and programmes (DFID 2009 as cited in Sha, 2023). What is clear from the above discussion is the attention given to how political interests shape economic policies and how economic interests shape political decisions, policies and programmes (Sha, 2023).

Findings and Discussions

Intervention programmes amongst resettled internally displaced communities have become a global agenda by agencies, policymakers and humanitarian actors for post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding. A clear factor to consider in every intervention programme is how such interventions are affected by existing power relations among stakeholders. So, power relations can hinder or promote the effectiveness of intervention efforts. This accounts for why Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and the World Bank (2017) posited that the political economy factors, such as governance structures, policy environment, resource allocation, stakeholders' structure and power relations, play a crucial role in shaping the success of every intervention programme.

Based on the analysis of data collected, the findings of this study are categorised into the following themes: stakeholders' structure (SS), power dynamics and level of engagement: setting of the policy agenda (SPA), dominant ideas and values in the intervention programme (DIV), and power distribution and interests among Stakeholders (PDIS). This illustrates the nature of stakeholder structure and their associated power engagement in the programme implemented.

Stakeholders' Structure (SS)

The data reveals that the NEFSLESP intervention programme implemented under the Fadama-II-AF-II in Taraba State is characterised by a multifaceted network of stakeholder engagement. This structure integrates various actors across national, state, and local levels, contributing to the efficiency and success of the project. The primary stakeholders involved include the World Bank, the Fadama National Office, and the Fadama Technical Office at the state level (K1-K7). The state office is overseen by the State Ministry of Agriculture with channels of authority to the National Fadama Office and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture.

Breakdown of the structure at the state and community levels, including key actors like the State Fadama Office, Community Leaders, the Local Government Chairman, Fadama facilitators, and desk officers (K1-K7). The engagement of politicians, traditional/community leaders, and development agents such as extension workers further broadens the programme's stakeholder structure. Again, service providers known as contractors constitute part of the structure, and different communities have different local contractors (K8 and K9). This is corroborated by Oyebode and Akinbile's study in (2021), which emphasises that the Community Driven Development model empowered local stakeholders by involving them in decision-making processes, which enhanced project efficiency, fostered a sense of ownership among beneficiaries and reduced bureaucratic bottlenecks.

Moreover, participatory rural development theories highlight that engaging stakeholders in projects fosters trust and acceptance among local communities, ensuring smoother project

execution (Chambers, 2017). Additionally, the involvement of technical staff, including facilitators and extension workers, aligns with best practices in agricultural interventions, where capacity-building and knowledge transfer are crucial for long-term success (Habib, 2024).

Figure 1: Stakeholders' Structure



In general, these findings are consistent with the argument of Earnest and Dickie (2012) and ICRC (2016). Earnest and Dickie (2012) stated that practitioners, aid agencies, and government are necessary actors in the planning and implementation of intervention programmes. However, they further affirmed that responses from these actors were usually regarded as inadequate. ICRC (2016) further stated that with the support of international and local humanitarian actors, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Federal and State Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies have been responding to the needs of IDPs in camps, the IDP host communities and the resettled communities.

Power Dynamics and level of engagement

It is argued that the making and implementation of public policy is enveloped in contestations and bargaining between interest groups with competing claims over rights and resources. This is further understood through the setting of the policy agenda, dominant ideas and values in the intervention programme, and power distribution and interests among stakeholders.

a. Setting of the policy agenda (SPA)

One key aspect of political economy analysis is the role of actors (state and non-state) in influencing decision-making processes. In Nigeria, policies and intervention programmes are often shaped by Federal, State, and Local Government Authorities, alongside International Donors and Civil Society Organisations (Ataire, Ataire, & Mark, 2021). Policy agenda setting is, therefore, a crucial process in governance and projects, involving multiple stakeholders who influence decision-making.

In the case of Fadama-III AF-II, the policy agenda was influenced by multiple stakeholders, including the World Bank and the Nigerian Government. These institutions played a central role in shaping the programme's implementation. Studies have shown that international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, often serve as key agenda setters by funding projects and defining policy priorities in developing countries (World Bank, 2015). At the State and Local levels, policy implementation relied on bureaucratic and political actors, including the State Fadama Coordination Office, local government officials, and community leaders.

... we are used to carrying out World Bank projects. The Fadama-III AF-II programme was funded by the World Bank in collaboration with the Nigerian Government. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the National Fadama Office are also part of those who set the policy (K1-K4).

Studies indicate that policy adoption in community development is more effective when it involves decentralised institutions and community participation (Ahmad and Talib, 2015). This

aligns with the structure of Fadama-III AF-II, where decision-making was collaborative, ensuring local government representatives and beneficiaries had input in project execution.

Decentralised governance structures enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of policy implementation. Evidence from agricultural policy studies in Nigeria suggests that local government officials and community leaders are crucial in adapting policies to regional needs (Nwalieji & Igbokwe, 2013). The involvement of Local Government Chairmen, Directors of Agricultural Services, and community facilitators in Fadama-III AF-II supports this finding.

... stakeholders of the project that is the Fadama State coordinator and her team under the Ministry of Agriculture (the permanent secretary, and the directors), the Local Government Chairman together with the Local Government Director of Agriculture Services, and the Head of works, Local Government Fadama Desk officers and facilitators, community leaders, and project beneficiaries (K 5,6, and 7).

b. Dominant ideas and values in the intervention programme (DIV)

Intervention programmes, particularly in post-conflict and rural development settings, are guided by dominant ideas and values that shape their implementation and effectiveness. The consensus drawn from the findings is that the intervention framework was demand-driven. As such, the ideas and demands of the beneficiaries dominated the intervention design. The Fadama-III Additional Financing-II (AF-II) programme also embodies several key values, including:

- i. **Participatory Decision-Making and Community Ownership:** This is where community leaders and local government representatives play a critical role in identifying beneficiaries and prioritising needs. The process of developing Community Action Plans (CAPs) with input from community members ensures that interventions are locally driven (K1, K2, K3). Study confirms that bottom-up approaches in rural development enhance project sustainability and community ownership (Kinyata & Abiodun, 2020). Mansuri and Rao (2012) further stated that in post-conflict rehabilitation programmes, participatory decision-making has been linked to greater community satisfaction and project success. The involvement of facilitators, local desk officers, and community leaders in Fadama aligns with these findings, reinforcing the principle of subsidiarity decisions should be made at the lowest effective level (Melé 2004).
- ii. **Inclusivity and Social Equity:** The programme prioritises vulnerable populations, particularly displaced persons and host communities, through a structured needs assessment and selection process (K3, K4, K5). This reflects the idea of social justice and equity, ensuring that displaced persons, resettled and host communities most affected by conflict receive support. Report from FAO (2024) suggests that targeted interventions that address the needs of suppressed and vulnerable groups promote social cohesion and reduce inequalities in rural communities. Mechanisms were also put in place to prevent elite capture, a common issue in community-driven development, by verifying and validating community demands at the state level (K3).

... needs assessments were carried out using facilitators whose major responsibility is to go into the communities and, in alliance with the community leaders, be able to find out displaced persons. Needs were demanded, analysed and verified by the state office to avoid elite interest (K3).

Platteau (2004) emphasise that for development interventions, transparency in resource allocation is critical in preventing local elites from monopolising benefits.

- iii. **Needs-Based Intervention and Livelihood Restoration:** The Fadama intervention operates on a demand-driven model, ensuring that assistance directly aligns with beneficiaries' stated needs (K8, K9, K10). The Community Action Plans (CAPs) serve as a structured mechanism for documenting and approving these needs, preventing arbitrary decision-making (K3, K11, K12).

... Fadama came and through our community leaders selected 40 of us based on the level of destruction done to us, and they asked each of us what we needed for us to return to our livelihoods (K8, 9, and 10).

... Fadama intervention is a complete package. Whatever the people demanded was first approved and delivered to them. The community decided on any of these projects: rehabilitation of road, warehouse construction, culvert construction, sinking of borehole, and lock-up stores (K5, 13, 14, and 15).

This shows that needs-based interventions in resettled communities are more effective than blanket aid (Siddiq, Elhaija, Wells, 2023). Again. The World Bank review of community-driven development projects highlights that needs-based and holistic interventions lead to greater resilience and self-sufficiency among beneficiaries (Mansuri & Rao, 2004).

c. Power Distribution and Interests among Stakeholders (PDIS)

Another critical factor in power dynamics and the level of engagement is the distribution of power and interests among stakeholders. Intervention programmes often involve multiple actors, including governments, international donors, private sector entities, and civil society organisations. Each stakeholder has its interests and incentives, which can either align with or obstruct the programme's objectives. Power asymmetries may lead to elite capture, where resources meant for target populations are carted away or diverted to more influential groups (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). This Power distribution in the intervention programme is shaped by the relationships among key stakeholders, their decision-making authority, and the interests they pursue. The Fadama-III Additional Financing-II (AF-II) programme involves a multi-layered governance structure, distributing power among state actors, local leaders, NGOs, contractors, and politicians. This structure further reflects the role of power dynamics in shaping policy implementation and resource allocation (Gaventa & Pettit, 2010).

From the findings, the state and local-level Fadama staff that are in charge of control planning and implementation, giving them a central role in directing programme execution. They coordinate local implementation, ensuring the correlation of national policies with grassroots needs (K1, K3). This is consistent with research indicating that government bureaucracies often serve as gatekeepers in donor-funded projects, managing budgets and setting priorities (Hickey, Lavers, Niño-Zarazúa, & Seekings, 2019). However, local leaders and NGOs act as auditors, holding implementing agencies accountable (K1, K3).

...Fadama staff at the state and local levels handle the planning and implementation process. Local leaders and NGOs serve as auditors. Service providers/contractors provided needed services in the form of contracts and financially benefited from the programme. Politicians also help out in identifying target communities and spreading the intervention across different communities (K1 and K3).

This aligns with Platteau, (2004) assertion that civil society participation enhances transparency and reduces corruption in community-driven projects. Different stakeholders

engage in the programme with varying interests and incentives. Service Providers/Contractors play critical roles in delivering the necessary infrastructure and services for the programme's success. They financially benefit from contracts (K1, K3). This reflects how development projects create economic opportunities for private actors (Collier, 2020). Politicians play the initial role of helping to identify benefiting communities, spreading interventions and monitoring the implementation process (K1, K3). This suggests that development aid can be influenced by political interests, as politicians often seek to distribute resources in ways that align with their constituencies (Golden & Min, 2013).

Local Fadama Desk Officers and Facilitators manage day-to-day operations. (K2, K3, K4). They are seen as local mobilisers and implementers, and also act as brokers between state institutions and communities. This highlights the role of local bureaucrats in mediating top-down policies and grassroots needs (Enns, Bersaglio, & Luhula, 2022).

... the Desk officer is the local Fadama desk officer resident in the local government secretariat that handles all Fadama activities. The facilitators work in the field with the community. They are the channels of communication, meetings and contact with beneficiaries (K2, 3 and 4).

Other major stakeholders are the traditional and community leaders. Their roles are significant in determining the success of the interventions in their communities. They are the resource persons used to educate their community members, particularly the beneficiaries, on the nature of the intervention. They also oversee and monitor the implementation process and report to the Fadama State Office (K2, K3, K4). Their involvement underscores the significance of local authority structures in legitimising external interventions (Agrawal & Ribot, 2012). The approval process for the Community Action Plan (CAP) by government officials (Chairman or Director of Agriculture) explains bureaucratic control (K1, K5, K6).

... The CAP developed by the facilitator must be approved by the chairman or director of Agric. Stakeholders like politicians, the community and traditional leaders are overseeing and monitoring the implementation. They meet quarterly to review the progress of the programme (K1, 5, and 6).

The role of politicians in spreading interventions across communities suggests that power is partly distributed based on political calculations rather than just technical need assessments (K1, K3). This supports findings that development programmes are sometimes used as tools for political patronage (Asabor, 2024). However, monitoring by community-based organizations (CBOs), NGOs, and traditional leaders (K2, K3, K4) may act as a counterbalance to political capture, reinforcing the principle of participatory governance (Gisselquist, 2018). Extension workers, otherwise known as development agents, play the role of providing capacity-building training and technical and advisory services to the beneficiaries of the intervention.

... the technical resource persons, known as extension workers or development agents, are providers of capacity-building training and technical and advisory services to the beneficiaries. Service provider: contractors who work in agreement to provide the items needed. CBOs, traditional leaders, and politicians were monitoring and evaluating the implementation level (K2, 3 and 4).

Conclusion

A qualitative (Key Informant Interview) approach was used to study stakeholders' structure and power dynamics in the NEFSLESP intervention programme implemented under the

auspices of Fadama-III-AF-II in Taraba State. The study found that the Fadama Programme's stakeholder structure reflects a participatory governance model that involved Fadama officers (National, State and Local levels), community leaders, politicians, development agents, and service providers. The power dynamics show that stakeholders engaged in the programme based on their roles and interests. Their interaction and influence were at various stages of the intervention process, from policy formulation, Community Action Plan design, and overall decision-making to implementation and monitoring. This shows that the multifaceted nature of collaborative efforts is effective in driving intervention programmes towards successful execution.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, it is recommended that:

- i. Government institutions and humanitarian donor agencies should enhance stakeholder roles, authority, and influence by properly distributing mandates to prevent conflicts and inefficiencies.
- ii. Government and donor agencies should also facilitate regular dialogues and feedback mechanisms among stakeholders throughout various stages of intervention projects. This approach will improve participatory governance and ensure alignment with the programme's development values.
- iii. The government should promote a balance of power in decision-making by fostering equitable representation and participation of all stakeholders, including beneficiaries, in the processes. It is essential to establish structures that ensure beneficiary ideas and needs are not only prominent but also well-integrated alongside the expertise and priorities of institutional entities like the World Bank and government bodies.
- iv. Government and civil society organisations should build systems that formally institutionalise the demand-driven nature of intervention programmes, thereby reducing elite capture of interventions. This includes creating adaptable frameworks that prioritise inclusivity and direct interventions to address the evolving needs of beneficiaries.

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