

Decentralised Policing System and Insecurity in Nigeria: An Opinion Survey of Residents of Ovia North East Local Government Area, Edo State

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Abstract

The study explored the opinions of the people of the Ovia Northeast Local Government, Edo State, regarding the increasing public opinion on decentralising the security system in Nigeria. The study was anchored on concentric circle theory that postulates that security management should begin from the community level, to the state level and the federal level for effective results. A sample of 400 residents of the Local government Area was obtained, and 352 questionnaires were returned. The data obtained were analysed with simple percentages, the mean and the standard deviation. The study found that respondents supported the creation of a state policing system backed by law in Nigeria; believe there will be no security implications for having state police because they believe that state actors will not hijack state police, collude with criminals to perpetrate crimes, use guns to steal from people or extort people; and believe that state police will be effective in tackling insecurity because they will work in the interest of the people rather than the Nigerian government. Based on these findings, the study, therefore, recommends that the National Assembly should amend the 1999 Constitution to accommodate the state policing system.

Keywords: Centralized Policing System, Decentralized Policing System, Internal Security management, Insecurity, Security,

Introduction

Insecurity in Nigeria has assumed a rather worrisome dimension in recent years. In all geopolitical zones of the country, insecurity manifests in peculiar and varied forms. In the North East, there is a prevalence of terrorism and insurgency, in the North West and North Central, banditry and farmer-herder clashes abound, in the South West, farmer-herder crisis and banditry hold sway, in the South-South, pipeline vandalism and cultism are ostensible, and in the South East, secessionist agitations, banditry and farmer-herder crises have assumed a hydra-headed dimension (Ebonine, 2022). These manifold insecurities challenge Nigeria's capacity to play a leading role regionally and globally, as its economy, political stability, social cohesion and development are heavily impacted.

Internally, there is increasing fear among residents, killing, destruction of property and infrastructure and displacements (Budgit, 2024). For instance, according to reports released by the News Agency of Nigeria (2024), between May 2023 and April 2024, no fewer than 614,937 people died across Nigeria. More so, in the same period, about 2.3 million Nigerians were kidnapped, and about N2.3 trillion (about \$ 1.5 billion) was paid in ransom. The rising trend in insecurity in Nigeria has raised fundamental questions about Nigeria's capacity to manage internal insecurity with its centralised security management style.

Security management in Nigeria follows a centralised system whereby the Police, the Army, the Navy, the Director of State Services (DSS), the State Security Services (SSS) and the

Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) are mandated by the constitution to tackle insecurity in Nigeria, within and outside Nigerian borders. While these agencies maintain their offices in all the states of Nigeria, the state governors do not control their activities or their operations. They are accountable to the President of Nigeria. The National Security Council, a body that should encompass the security experts from both federal and state levels, including the president and the state governors, has only federal personnel, such as the President, the Vice President, the National Security Adviser, the Chief of Defence Staff, Inspector General of Police and Minister of Internal and Foreign Affairs. Lack of inputs from the states, without doubt, contributes to the raging insecurity in Nigeria. Moreover, the security agencies at the state level do not understand the terrain, causing the residents to see and treat them as foreigners rather than collaborators (Sowale, 2025).

Against this backdrop, this study examines the centralisation of the policing system in Nigeria to understand the imperative for a decentralised policy system as a solution to the prevailing insecurity issues in Nigeria. It argues that decentralisation of the policing system is integral to the federal system Nigeria practices; therefore, it is a viable pathway to ensuring that the lives and property of Nigerians are effectively and efficiently protected. To achieve this tasking objective, the study adopts a positivist philosophical tradition that prioritises quantitative tools like questionnaires to study and understand phenomena by sampling people's perceptions.

Decentralised Policing and Insecurity in Nigeria

In the context of this study, decentralised policing, also referred to as state policing, is defined as a broader security framework, where law enforcement and responsibilities are distributed between the federal and subnational governments (Ayorinde & Ariguzo, 2020). In a federal system like Nigeria, it is expected that there should be a clearly defined jurisdiction and a degree of autonomy by each layer of government to avoid a clash of roles and responsibilities. In practice, as earlier stated, security responsibility in Nigeria is centralized, with attendant consequences on internal security: festering of security challenges, loss of security personnel, increasing public mistrust and damaging international rating (Onwudiwe, 2024).

Insecurity has been conceptualised as the absence of peace, safety, gladness and the protection of human and physical resources or the presence of crisis or threats to human dignity, all of which undermine the development and progress of any human society (Afolabi, 2015). Nigeria is at a crossroads, with the complex and multi-dimensional nature of insecurity being considered. Unfortunately, the ravaging insecurity is not a recent phenomenon, though it has worsened in recent years, ranging from terrorism, banditry, cultism, to kidnapping (Tuki, 2024; Anumve, Fada and Igah, 2020).

In Edo State, insecurity level in Edo State assumes a worrisome dimension due to its complexity. According to Aghedo and Osumah (2021), the old security threats — armed robbery, cultism, kidnapping, cybercrime and human trafficking — have not only persisted, but also taken an eclectic dimension. The perpetrators of criminal activities in the state include youths, children and politicians. For instance, the Nigerian Police Force (2020) reported that in 2019 alone, there were 107 armed robbery cases, 133 kidnapping cases, and 60 cult activities. In the same period, the state recorded the highest incidences of crime compared to Delta and Bayelsa States. More recently, the Partnerships Initiatives in the Niger Delta, in George (2024), reported that between January 2021 and December 2023, no fewer than 180 cult-related fatalities were recorded across the state. In Ovia Northeast Local Government Area, Amadasu and Etinisa (2024) found that the farmer-herder conflict has been the most prevalent security threat across

the four selected communities (Uhiere, Osasimwinoba, Odighi, and Okokuo) in the Ovia Northeast Local Government Area, affecting food security in the area. Generally, factors such as corruption, ideological differences, climate variability, marginalisation and poverty and unemployment have been adduced as reasons for insecurity in Nigeria.

Managing the security crises has consistently generated debates in Nigeria (Igbini, 2018). Sections 214-216 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria outline that the management of internal security in Nigeria is the exclusive preserve of the Nigerian Police Force. Other key agencies include the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), the Nigerian Correctional Service (NCS), the Nigerian Fire Service, the State Security Service and the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC).

Bakare and Aderinola (2019) focused on the Nigerian Police and internal security management. The authors noted that despite undergoing various reforms, the Nigerian Police have not lived up to the expectations of Nigerians, leading to clamour for models of policing that can best suit the Nigerian heterogeneous nature — decentralised policing system, community-based policing and the incorporation of non-state policing institutions to mainstream policing. As the authors noted, none of these models is without its peculiar problems. Therefore, the centralisation of internal security management in Nigeria has not fared better in addressing the multifarious insecurity crises in Nigeria, hence, the increasing clamour for a decentralised security system, although the operational and organisational outlook of the state-level security outfit is still debatable.

Theoretical Framework

The Concentric Circle Theory has become one of the theoretical perspectives in security studies. The theory was first proposed by Ernest Burgess in 1925. He used the theory to analyse how different social groups are situated in a metropolitan area. As Shehu and Garba (2020:2) captured it, “concentric circles are circles that form within each other around a common point. It also means circles that share the same centre, axis or origin with one inside the other.” Since then, different disciplines have adopted the theory to analyse both foreign and domestic events and policies. For instance, Jemirade (2020) utilised the theory to analyse national defence policies. In the Nigerian context, Ibrahim Gambari, a former Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister, argued that the foreign policies of Nigeria should begin from Nigeria, to Africa and the rest of the world. This strategic foreign policy framework would enable Nigeria to prioritise its plans and resources as well as prevent wastage.

There is no agreement as to how many concentric circles the concentric circles theory should contain. Yakubu (2014) utilised the three concentric circles theory to explain the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria. Hassan, in Olufemi (2011), used the four concentric circles theory to explain that Nigeria’s foreign objectives should begin with Nigeria, to West Africa, to the wider African nations and internationally. In the context of the study, the concentric circles theory of security management assumes that security concerns and actions exist at different levels of an environment, to a point, which can be thought of as a “security community” (Vogt 1990).

From the person, community, region, or country to the worldwide community, this assumes that security issues and operations should be prioritised by each circle or security community hierarchically. Even though there are various ways in which these security communities intersect, security at lower levels must be adequately addressed and concentrated on before moving on to higher levels to prevent security gaps at these lower levels (Nabhon 2013:226, 227).

Internal security management in Nigeria must be prioritised from the bottom up if there is any need for stability and peace. With the spates of killings and displacements, which appear to have overwhelmed federal security agencies, the need for state policing cannot be overemphasised. In most countries of the world, security has been decentralised to begin with the community level, to the state level, and to the federal level. As we shall later see in this study, the decentralised security system has ensured that insecurity is reduced to a manageable level while economic growth has continued to thrive. Nigeria can borrow a leaf from these countries and situate its security framework within the domestic context of each state for maximum achievement.

Methodology

The study adopted a quantitative research design that seeks to draw a pool of data using a structured questionnaire to put in perspective the impact of the farmer-herder crisis on food security in Ovia North East LGA of Edo State. The population comprises both men and women resident in the LGA. According to City Population (2022), the estimated population of Ovia North East LGA is 229,500, from where a sample size of four hundred (400) respondents was derived, using Taro Yamane's formula. The main instrument for data collection in this research was the structured questionnaire.

It was structured in a Likert format of Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), and Disagree (D). Strongly Disagree (SD) and Undecided (U). Out of 400 distributed questionnaires, 352 questionnaires were returned, and 48 were lost in the process. Thus, there was an 88% rate, which was significant for use in the study. Completed questionnaires were coded and entered into Microsoft Excel before being exported to the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 27). The bio-data of respondents was presented in simple percentages and graphical representations. The research questions were analysed in mean and standard deviation. The decision of whether to accept or reject depends on whether the individual item in the questionnaire is greater than/or equal to 3 or less than 3. This is represented thus: $\bar{x} \geq 3$; accepted; $\bar{x} < 3$; rejected.

Results

Bio-Data of the Respondents

Table 1: Participants' sample characteristics, N=352 (% in parentheses).

Description	Options	Frequency (%)
Age	Below 20	50(14.2)
	20-30	82(23.3)
	31-40	137(38.9)
	Above 40	83(23.6)
Sex	Male	198(56.0)
	Female	154(44.0)
Religion	Christianity	212(60)
	Islam	82(23)
	Traditional	58(17)
	Religion	
Marital Status	Single	130(36.9)

Academic qualification	Married	204(58.0)
	Divorced	18(5.1)
	WAEC/NECO	187(53.1)
	ND/HND	99(28.1)
	BSC	4(1.1)
	MSc	0(0)
Occupation	PhD	0(0)
	None	62(17.6)
	Trader	137(42)
	Farmer	171(52)
	Civil Servant	18(6)

Source: Field Data (2025)

The table above shows that a majority of 137 respondents, constituting 38.9% are between the ages of 31 and 40, followed by 83 respondents representing 23.6% who are above 40, followed by 82 respondents representing 23.3% who are between 20 and 30, and lastly followed by 50 respondents representing 14.2% who are below 20. By sex, 198 respondents, constituting 56.0% of respondents, are males, while 154 respondents, constituting 44.0% are females. By religion, 82 respondents, constituting 23.0% of respondents, practice Islam, 212 respondents, constituting 60.0% practice Christianity, while 58 respondents, constituting 17.0% practice Traditional Religion.

By marital status, 204 respondents, constituting 58.0% of respondents, are married, 130 respondents, constituting 36.9% of respondents, are single, while 18 respondents, constituting 5.1% are divorced. By academic qualification, a majority of 187 respondents, constituting 53.1% possess WAEC/NECO, followed by 99 respondents representing 28.1% that possess ND/HND certificates, followed by 62 respondents representing 17.6% do not possess any qualification, and lastly followed by 4 respondents representing 1.1% possess BSc qualifications. Lastly, by occupation, a majority of 171 respondents, constituting 52.0% are farmers, followed by 137 respondents representing 42.0% that are traders, and lastly followed by 18 respondents representing 6% that are civil servants.

Table 2: Mean Rating of Respondents' opinions on the enactment of state policing law in Nigeria

Nos	Enactment of state policing law in Nigeria	Mean (\bar{x})	Std. Dev.	Decision
7	I want the National Assembly to make laws for the establishment of state police in Nigeria	4.54	1.400	Accepted
8	I want the state police to carry arms like the federal police in Nigeria	4.03	1.321	Accepted
9	The emoluments and entitlements of the state police officers should be sufficient to enable them to carry out their job	3.67	1.040	Accepted

Source: SPSS Output (2025)

Table 2 above shows the respondents' opinions on the enactment of the state policing law in Nigeria. A mean of 4.54, with a standard deviation of 1.40, indicated that the respondents

wanted the National Assembly to establish the state police in Nigeria. Thus, since mean (\bar{x}) > 3, we accept the item. Also, a mean of 4.03 with a standard deviation of 1.321 opined that they wanted the state police to carry arms like the federal police in Nigeria. Therefore, mean (\bar{x}) > 3, and we accept the item. A mean of 3.67 with a standard deviation of 1.040 showed that the respondents agreed that the emoluments and entitlements of the state police officers should be sufficient to make them carry out their job. Thus, we accept the item since mean (\bar{x}) > 3.

Table 3: Mean Rating of Respondents' opinions on the security implications of state policing in Ovia North East Local Government Area

Nos.	Security Implications of State Policing in Nigeria in the Ovia North East Local Government Area	Mean (\bar{x})	Std. Dev.	Decision
10	The Nigerian politicians will hijack the state police structure in my area	2.46	1.339	Rejected
11	State police will collude with criminals to perpetrate crime in my area	2.58	1.322	Rejected
12	State police will use the guns to steal from the people in my area	2.66	1.322	Rejected
13	State police will extort the people in my area	2.50	1.300	Rejected

Source: SPSS Output (2025)

Table 3 above shows the respondents' opinions on the security implications of state policing in Ovia North East Local Government Area. A mean of 2.46, with a standard deviation of 1.339, showed that the respondents were of the view that the Nigerian politicians would hijack the state police structure in their areas. Thus, since mean (\bar{x}) < 3, we reject the item as untrue. Also, a mean of 2.58 with a standard deviation of 1.322, indicated that the respondents felt that the state police would collude with criminals to perpetrate crime in their areas. Therefore, mean (\bar{x}) < 3, and we reject the item as false. A mean of 2.66 with a standard deviation of 1.322 showed that respondents indicated that the state police will use the guns provided to them to steal from people. Thus, we reject the item as untrue since mean (\bar{x}) < 3.

Table 4: Mean Rating of Respondents' opinions on the effectiveness of state policing in tackling insecurity in the Ovia North East Local Government Area

Nos.	Effectiveness of state policing in tackling insecurity in the Ovia North East Local Government Area	Mean (\bar{x})	Std. Dev.	Decision
14	State police will address the issue of insecurity in my area more than the federal security forces	3.09	1.043	Accepted
15	State police will work in the interest of the government rather than the people in my area	2.98	1.454	Rejected

Source: SPSS Output (2025)

Table 4 above shows the respondents' opinions on the effectiveness of state policing in tackling insecurity in the Ovia North East Local Government Area. A mean of 3.09, with a standard deviation of 1.043, showed that the respondents were of the view that the state police will address the issue of insecurity in their areas more than the federal security. Thus, since mean (\bar{x}) > 3, we accept the item as true. Also, a mean of 2.98 with a standard deviation of 1.454

indicated the respondents' views that the state police will work in the interest of the government rather than the people in my area in their areas. Therefore, mean (\bar{x}) <3, and we reject the item as false.

Discussion

The first finding of the study was that respondents supported the creation of a state policing system backed by law in Nigeria. As stated earlier in the study, there has been an ongoing debate among security experts, scholars, academics, opinion leaders, policy makers and interested persons regarding the need for the establishment of state policing in Nigeria. The recurring insecurity across Nigeria intensifies this call for security decentralisation. According to Onoja, Odumu, Moses-Ojo and Ejeh (2024), every country on the globe with subnational organisations has a multilevel policing structure. There are other names for it, including state police, regional police, and provincial police. Every country has a different way of doing things, how it operates, and how it interacts with the central police. The central police, however, have more authority than the subnational police in the majority of jurisdictions. Among the nations that have state police are America, India, Indonesia, Germany, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and a few more (Agboluaje, 2024).

In the United Kingdom, 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales, Police Scotland, and the Northern Ireland police agency share operational and financial authority for policing. The British transport police and all of these devolved policing authorities work together strategically (Walker & Katz, 2017). The philosophical justification for the devolution of policing authority in the UK is not implausible; a police constable in Dunfermline, Scotland, who has lived there his entire life, is more knowledgeable about the complexities of criminality, criminal gangs, and actionable intelligence on both than a police constable in Surrey, England (Walker & Katz, 2017).

Likewise, the state policing in the United States performs a variety of security functions to complement the activities of the federal police and local police. Popularly known as state troopers, the state police in the United States enforce traffic laws on state highways and interstates, and oversee the security of state capitol complexes, protect governors, train new officers for local police forces and provide technological and scientific support. They also help to coordinate multi-jurisdictional task force activity in serious or complicated cases in states that grant full police powers statewide (Coyne and Yatsyshina, 2021; Bechtel, 1995; Corcoran, 1924). These instances show the premium attached to insecurity, leading to the devolution of the security sector.

Another dimension to state policing in Nigeria is the question of arms bearing. Indeed, the proliferation of small and light arms in Nigeria, most of which are concentrated in the hands of non-state actors, has pushed this concern. As the respondents opined, state police should be allowed to bear the same operational firearms as their federal counterparts. This will enable them to confront security threats head-on without fear. Police firearm use varies significantly across nations. Some are allowed to bear certain types of arms, while others are allowed to bear arms in certain circumstances or not at all. It depends on the cultural norms, arms control policies or perceived need for armed law enforcement. For instance, in the U.S. alone, over 1,000 fatal police shootings occur annually (World Population Review, 2025). More so, there are 21 countries whose police officers are not allowed to carry firearms. Among them are China, Britain, Malawi, Norway and New Zealand. However, in China, under certain circumstances,

SWAT teams or specialised units are allowed to carry firearms. In Britain, police in Northern Ireland are allowed to carry guns (World Population Review, 2025).

It is understandable the reason most countries do not allow their police to bear arms. The rate of insecurity in advanced countries of Europe and America is abysmally low compared to African countries. In the Nigerian context, non-state criminal actors bear varied sophisticated weapons, which require a measurable sophisticated weapons from the police to counteract their threats. Not allowing the Nigerian police to bear arms to confront the criminal elements will be suicidal.

In addition, state police officers should be properly taken care of. The inability of the Nigerian government to prioritise the welfare of the Nigerian police force has been an age-long public debate. While there are undeniable efforts at improving the welfare of Nigerian police officers, including signing agreements with relevant agencies for alternative energy and vehicle conversions to compressed natural gas (Jannamike, 2024), the gap is still very wide. According to Oyewole (2024) and Madume and Owulo (2024), the fundamental challenges facing the Nigerian Police Force are a lack of adequate new technologies and poor remuneration. Recently, on July 21, 2025, the retired Nigerian police force protested against poor pension and welfare (Omonobi, Akinyemi, Nanlong and Aliu, 2025). When the welfare of police officers is prioritised, they will be motivated to risk their lives for the citizens and vice versa. Some may resort to colluding with criminals, a phenomenon also observed in Nigeria, to perpetrate crimes in order to survive (Aborisade and Fayemi, 2015).

The second finding shows that respondents believe there will be no security implications for having state police because they believe that state actors will not hijack state police, collude with criminals to perpetrate crimes, use guns to steal from people or extort people. The level of police corruption in Nigeria is alarming, and according to Gillanders, Ouédraogo, Maiga and Aja-Eke (2023), it is the most dangerous form of corruption. Banini (2020) noted that the extent of corruption in the security sector has affected the effectiveness of the military to respond to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. This suggests that there is a link between security (police) corruption and national security (Hope, 2018; Oarhe and Aghedo, 2010). Police corruption can hurt the general well-being of the people (Agbiboa, 2015). Dincer and Johnston (2021) found that the level of police corruption in the United States predicts the killings of Black Americans, as police behaviour epitomises flagrant disregard of accountability. In the Nigerian context, the EBDSARS protest was triggered by the disgruntled youths against perennial police brutality (Iwuoha and Aniche, 2022).

Based on this evidence, it is surprising how the respondents thought that state police would not replicate these criminal activities. Perhaps the euphoria that has greeted the creation of the state police as a result of exhaustion with various criminal activities perpetrated by the federal police is responsible. However, the state police may be held accountable by the people since they are closer to them than the federal police, who are mostly accountable to the federal government.

The last finding is that the respondents believe that state police will be effective in tackling insecurity because they will work in the interest of the people rather than the Nigerian government. There is no supportive evidence regarding this belief in Nigeria, given the ubiquity of corruption as well as collusion between the police and the federal government, as the former prefers to do the bidding of the latter (Gillanders et al. 2023; Iheriohanma, Oguchialu and Lasisi, 2020). Notwithstanding, those in support of the state police (Oyewole, 2024; Madume and Owulo, 2024), anchor their views on the difficult Nigerian geographical terrain that makes it

difficult for foreigners or strangers, like most of the Nigerian security forces, to navigate and arrest criminals who often take advantage of their mastery of the geography to escape being caught. Also, they believe that information and communication sharing between the locals and security forces will improve when the state police are put in place.

Globally, evidence has shown the relationship between state policing (decentralised policing) and a reduction in crimes. For instance, according to the 2024 World Population Review Crime Survey, following the decentralised policing models, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, for example, had 46.70, 46.90, and 49.20 crimes per 100,000, respectively, whereas Nigeria, which has a centralised command-and-control policing approach, recorded 65.80 crimes per 100,000. Therefore, there is a statistically significant positive variation of 18.2 crimes per 100,000 persons in Nigeria compared to the average crime rate of 47.6 crimes per 100,000 in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to the aforementioned data, state policing appears to be more goal-oriented than the centralised policing approach that is currently in use in Nigeria. In Africa, where each nation has a different level of autonomy and decentralization for its state police forces, the decentralized police system in Ghana has reduced crime rates by 15% between 2017 and 2020, 12% between 2015 and 2020 in Senegal, 20% between 2018 and 2022 in Liberia, and 18% between 2017 and 2002 (Onoja, Odumu, Moses-Ojo, And Ejeh, 2024).

Conclusion and Recommendations

A decentralised policing system is a global phenomenon, and the current study has alluded to it. Based on the findings made, the study, therefore, concludes that the federal or centralised policing system in Nigeria is no longer enjoying the people's support in light of recurring insecurity. The people believe that with an adequate legal and logistical framework, state policing would work effectively as it would enjoy people's support, promote information and communication sharing, and ensure that difficult terrain that provides succour for criminals will be reached. Furthermore, the findings have confirmed the Concentric Circle Theory deployed in the study. As a popular global practice, security management is better achieved when it is decentralised, involving not only the formal personnel like the trained police officers, but also the critical stakeholders such as the civil society, the media, the community leaders, and traditional institutions.

Based on the findings and conclusions made in the study, the following recommendations are made. First, the National Assembly should amend the 1999 Constitution to accommodate the state policing system. The current legal position on policing in Nigeria is centred on the federal government, with little or no state government contribution. In a federal system, powers are shared between the federal government and its subordinate units within the provisions of the law. By this, no organ will tend to usurp the powers of the other without legal consequences. The legislative lists in the Constitution contain three separate items upon which laws can be made by the three tiers of government: the exclusive list (containing items exclusively for the federal government to make laws), the concurrent lists (items for both the federal and state governments can make laws), and the residual lists (items for only the state governments to make laws). Transferring security matters to the concurrent list will ensure that the states are accountable to the people in discharging their security functions.

Second, in approving the creation of state police, the welfare of the police officers should be prioritised. A motivated Nigerian worker can be the best in the world. The operational and logistical supports, be provided. The federal government, through the National Assembly, in

collaboration with state assemblies, should provide oversight over financial expenditure to ensure better service delivery and accountability.

Third, one of the hindrances to effective security provision is a lack of information and communication from the local people. It is no longer news that criminals are family members and relatives of the community residents. Unwillingness to provide useful information to security agents is due to an increasing level of mistrust of the security agencies. This study, therefore, recommends that recruitment to the state police formation should not only be transparent but also include more of the locals who understand the terrain and the nature of the crime. By this arrangement, locals may be willing to disclose useful information to the security agents based on trust.

Lastly, there is a need to consult with critical stakeholders, such as traditional rulers, community leaders, the media, civil society, and youth leaders, in the formation of the state police. This will help eliminate potential internal sabotage and promote the timely intervention of security agents in protecting human rights.

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